Do we need a state?

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Author: Patrick Crozier

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I mentioned earlier that I am very much enjoying Stefan Molyneux's podcasts. However, despite us both calling ourselves libertarians, that doesn't mean we agree.

So, what's the disagreement?

Well, it's not so much a disagreement as a case of me not being quite sure. I'll start by outlining what I think he thinks. Now, I could have got this wrong and if I have, well, I am happy to be corrected, but this is his central view as it seems to me:

1. Freedom delivers the goodies
2. But that argument doesn't sell
3. The only argument that sells is the moral one
4. Any moral argument has to be along the lines of: if it is wrong for me to do such and such, then it is wrong for the state to do it
5. It is wrong for me to use force, therefore, it is wrong for the state to use force
6. Bye bye, state

It's point 4. I take issue with

Why's that?

Because, it misses out the possibility of contract. In other words, I might make a deal with the state that allows it to use force against me under certain circumstances.

What sort of circumstances?

The obvious example is that of external threat. If I feel that there is a danger of foreign invasion, I might accept a certain amount of coercion.

But Molyneux thinks that external threats are overblown?

I am sure they frequently are. It is very much in the state's interest to exaggerate them. But just because you are paranoid doesn't mean they aren't all out to get you. Just because the state exaggerates threats doesn't mean there aren't any.

For example?

Britain, 1940

But Molyneux reckons that Britain (via the Treaty of Versailles) invited the aggression on itself. And, anyway, wasn't Britain the one who declared war?

On the Treaty of Versailles point, regardless of whether that is true (the argument being that it was Britain who initiated the force) or not, it doesn't (by itself) contradict the assertion that in 1940 Britain faced an external threat.

On the point about Britain declaring war, the assumption is that Hitler would have left Britain alone. I'm not so sure about this. Partly because it seems to me that bullies who get away with it just find new targets for their bullying and partly because of the economic drivers of Hitler's campaigns of conquest.

Economic drivers?

Socialist economics don't work. My understanding that at least one of the reasons Germany embarked on its campaign of conquest in 1938 was that it was rapidly running out of money.

Why might you accept coercion in the face of an external threat?

• Because war is frightening. The natural instinct is to run away. Getting men to stand and fight and to obey orders takes a certain amount of coercion - or at least the threat of it. Incidentally, coercion by consent is precisely what happens right now in the volunteer armed forces of Britain and the US.
• Because war is expensive. You might not be able to raise the money you need.

You say coercion is necessary, but the USAAF didn't need coercion in the Second World War

Ah, there's a point here. According to Tail-end Charlies airmen who didn't feel like going on an operation could opt out. In theory they could opt out for as long as they liked. But, still, discipline was maintained. But even so, the USAAF, like all branches of the US armed forces still needed funds coerced from taxpayers. Hey, perhaps there's an argument here about how in Total War coercion becomes wider but shallower. And, anyway, it's a slightly specialised example. As soon as as the plane takes off there's no real chance of running away - unless the captain - decides to turn back (which did happen from time to time). In a military formation, running away is a distinct possibility. It seems to me that there has to be the threat of severe punishment in that event in order to keep discipline. I could be wrong but that does seem to be how successful armies operate.

On the point of the cost, Molyneux reckons that all you really need is a few nukes which are comparatively cheap

I am not sure how cheap nukes are but assuming this is the case I am not entirely sure you would want a nuclear strike as your only option. But even so, cheap as they are, nukes will still cost some money. That being the case you have to ask yourself how they would be funded.

Well, maybe it could be funded by lottery?

But the lottery doesn't raise anything like as much as the defence budget. Of course, in the absence of the state and taxation, citizens would have a lot more money to play around with so, maybe they would be prepared to splash out rather more on the lottery especially if they thought it was all in a good cause. But maybe they wouldn't. And this is the point. Much as I detest force and the state, I want to pretty sure everything is going to be OK if we get rid of it.

But doesn't a lot of that depend on how you think things are going to go with the state?

There's a point here. I am very pessimistic about how things are going - at least as far as the state is concerned. Things could easily get sufficiently bad that a leap into the unknown will seem like a sensible course of action.

Is it unknown? Are there any precedents for defence without the state?

Not that I know of.

Getting back to the funding question, perhaps it could be done in the same way ships were funded in the Napoleonic Wars

Now, this is more like it. As I understand it, quite a lot of the Royal Navy's ships were private purchases. Obviously, you'd have to be fabulously wealthy to be able to afford one. I also understand that quite a few British Army regiments originated as privately-owned formations. The question is: who would want to do it today? Perhaps some very rich men. You never know Bill Gates could be persuaded to buy an aircraft carrier...

But isn't there another point that if you fear coercion it hardly matters whether that coercion is external or internal?

This is a point that Molyneux makes here. I think it is worth fleshing out. The external threat is the threat of coercion ie that we will be killed, our women raped, our property stolen. But if the fear is coercion how can the answer be coercion ie taxes to fund an army? The possible answer to this is that the coercion you may face from internal agents is not as bad as the coercion you may face from external agents.

So, what do you think of that argument?

Well, I suppose one has to look at some examples we know about - the best ones being where a country was successfully invaded after resisting:

• Iraq before and after the invasion. Moot point I'd say.
• Germany before and after the collapse of Nazism. Probably depended on whether you lived in the east or west and whether you were Jewish or not.
• Poland in 1939. External threat much worse than the internal.
• Western Europe 1940. Ditto.

Getting back to your point about coercion by agreement, there's no agreement between you and the state right now. How would it work?

I'm not sure.

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